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Pollution, Health and Life Expectancy: How Environmental Policy 
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Summary 
This article investigates the influence of environmental policy on growth assuming that 
the channel of transmission relies on the link between pollution, health and the survival 
probability, in an overlapping generations model à la Blanchard (1985) where growth is 
driven by a mechanism à la Romer (1986). We demonstrate that environmental policy 
has an ambiguous effect on growth in the steady-state when the detrimental impact of 
pollution on health and lifetime is taken into account: for low levels of taxation, 
environmental policy promotes growth while it is harmful to growth for high levels. 
Furthermore, we show that the environmental policy is more likely to promote growth 
(i.e. it stimulates growth for a wider range of environmental taxes) when public 
expenditures in health and/or the impact of pollution on health are important. Finally, 
using numerical simulations, we find that for the value of parameters chosen the 
environmental policy will be more likely to harm growth when agents smooth 
consumption over time. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
Even if the link between environmental policy and growth is a longstanding debate, re-
cent reports upon climate change and the very quick and unbridled industrialization of the
biggest economies in the world, such as China and India,1 have dramatically emphasized
the pressing necessity to implement efﬁcient and global environmental policy with an eye
towards economic performances.
This article investigates the effect of environmental policy on growth emphasizing the
link between pollution, health and life expectancy as the main channel of transmission.
It gets away from two observations about the existing literature on the environment and
growth. First, as highlighted by Ricci (2007) in a recent survey, the trade-off between envi-
ronmental quality and growth is negative in both basic AK, R&D-driven growth or human
capital accumulation models: reducingpollution to increase the environmental qualityturns
away resources to investment and therefore drags down growth. To offset this negative ef-
fect, it is necessary, for example, either to take into account the external inﬂuences of the
environment on productivity or some policy-induced adjustments (see Ricci (2007) p. 694),
either to assume an inﬂuence of environmental policy on savings behaviour or constant re-
turns to scale in the pollution abatement sector (see Michel and Rotillon (1995)). Second,
while the detrimental inﬂuence of pollution on health is one of the most well-documented
phenomenon in the ﬁeld and one of the most striking features of the negative impact of
pollution on individuals,2 few growth analysis integrate it explicitly.3
1From the World Development Indicators (the World Bank), in 2005, India and China grew respectively at
an annual rate of 9.23% and 10.20% (in stable increase) while the World and the High income countries grew
respectively at 3.48% and 2.66%.
2For a survey of studies on pollution and health, see Brunekreef and Holgate (2002), and references in
Gutierrez (2005) and Pautrel (in press).
3While Gradusand Smulders (1993)justify the negative impact of pollution on human capitalaccumulation
by its effect on health, their formalization seems too rough to enable to capture all the mechanisms at work.
Note that the inﬂuence of pollution on health has already been accounted for in models that do not investigate
its effect on growth. In a continuous time framework, Williams (2002, 2003), for example, studies its impact
in terms of environmental taxation assuming that pollution leads to absenteeism due to illness and to higher
medical care expenses. In a discrete time framework, Gutierrez (2005), for example, explicitly integrates theXavier Pautrel – “How environmental policy can promote growth” 3
Consequently, in this article, we re-examinate the relation between the environment and
growth, taking into account the impact of pollution on health and life expectancy as the
main channel of transmission, and without making any assumption about a positive effect
of the environmental quality on factors productivity. For this purpose, we use an overlap-
ping generations model à la Blanchard (1985) in which we model explicitly the link between
pollution and public health and its impact on the lifetime of the agents. Long-run growth is
driven by externalities from the aggregate stock of physical capital (AK model à la Romer
(1986)) and the lifetime of agents depends on public health which is inﬂuenced negatively
by the level of pollution and positively by public health expenditures.
In this AK model with environmental and health concerns, we demonstrate that environ-
mental policy has an ambiguous effect on growth in the steady-state when the detrimental
effect of pollution on health and life expectancy is taken into account. For low levels of
taxation, the environmental policy promotes growth because the positive effect of a lower
net ﬂow of pollution on health and life expectancy offsets the drag-down effect on the in-
vestment due to the increasing tax. For higher levels, the environmental policy becomes
harmful to growth because the positive effect of health is defeated by the drag-down effect.
We show that the higher public expenditures in health and the greater the impact of pollu-
tion on health, the more the environmental policy is likely to promote growth. Furthermore,
we demonstrate that when pollution does not affect health, environmental policy remains
detrimental to growth whatever the value of the tax, even if the lifetime of agents is ﬁnite.
Finally, wemake numericalsimulationstoinvestigate theinﬂuenceofthe intertemporal sub-
stitution rate of consumption on our result. We ﬁnd that, for the value of parameters chosen,
the environmental policy is more likely to harm growth when agents smooth consumption
over time.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 gives the basic framework of our model
and section 3 formalizes the link between pollution, health and the life expectancy. Section
link between pollution and health costs for the elderly and shows that pollution makes dynamic inefﬁciency
more likely.Xavier Pautrel – “How environmental policy can promote growth” 4
4 investigates the steady-state equilibrium of the economy. Section 5 looks into the impact
of environmental taxation on growth and section 6 goes into detail using numerical simula-
tions. Section 7 draws this article to a conclusion.
2 THE ECONOMY’S STRUCTURE
Let us consider an overlapping generations model à la Blanchard (1985) with human capital
accumulation and environmental concerns. Time is continuous. Each individual born at
time s faces a constant probability of death per unit of time λs ≥ 0. Consequently, his life
expectancy is 1/λs. When λs increases, the horizon of the economy becomes shorter. Attime
s, a cohort of size λs is born. This cohort has a size equal to λse−λs(t−s) at time t. The constant
population is equal to Lt ≡
  t
−∞ λse−λs(t−s)ds at time t. For convenience it is normalized to
unity. There are insurance companies and there is no bequest motive.
Contrary to Blanchard (1985), we assume that the probability of death for an agent born
at time s depends negatively on the public health in the economy when he is born εs. To
simplify we pose λs = ε−1
s .











t ]1−1/σ − 1
1− 1/σ σ  = 1,
lncs,t − φlnPt σ = 1,
(2)
where cs,t denotes consumption in period t of an agent born at time s, ρ ≥ 0 is the rate of
time preference and φ measures the weight in utility attached to the environment, that is
environmental care. σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Due to the simple demographic structure, all individual variables are additive acrossXavier Pautrel – “How environmental policy can promote growth” 5





The aggregate production function is deﬁned by:
Yt = ˜ AtKα
t L1−α
t , 0 < α < 1 (3)
with Yt being the aggregate ﬁnal output. Kt is the aggregate stock of physical capital and
Lt is the amount of labor. As discussed in Romer (1986), we assume that there exists exter-
nal effects of aggregate capital on productivity: ˜ At = AK1−α
t , where A > 0 is a constant
parameter. Consequently, the aggregate production function reduces to:
Yt = AKtL1−α
t
Finally we assume that the government implements two types of policy: a health policy
which consists in publicly providing health services to agents and an environmental policy
which consists in taxing the ﬂow of pollution from ﬁrms. The government is assumed to
balance its budget constraint all the time (see below).
3 POLLUTION, HEALTH AND LIFETIME
Following Gradus and Smulders (1993), pollution ﬂow is assumed to increase with the stock






, γ > 0 (4)
We consider that public health at time s is inﬂuenced negatively by the net ﬂow of pollu-







4We follow empirical studies which use in their estimations expenditures in health as a percentage of GDP
rather than the amount of expenditures in health (see Currais and Rivera (1999), Currais and Rivera (2003) for
example).Xavier Pautrel – “How environmental policy can promote growth” 6
where θ is the exogenous part of the aggregate ﬁnal output that the government uses to
publicly provide public-health services. β > 0 is the productivity of the health sector, δ is a
positive parameter and ψ > 0 measures the inﬂuence of pollution on public health.
Abatement activities use ﬁnal output (one for one) so the ﬁnal market clearing condition
is:
(1 − θ)Yt = Ct + ˙ Kt + Dt. (6)
4 THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND THE BALANCED GROWTH PATH
In this section, we derive the dynamical system which summarize the intertemporal evo-
lution of the economy and the steady-state deﬁned as a balanced-growth path equilibrium
where C, Y, D and K evolve at a common positive rate of growth.
As previously noted, besides its health policy, the government also implements an envi-
ronmental policy which consists of taxing the net ﬂow of pollution by ﬁrms and transferring
to them the fruit of the taxes to fund their abatement activities. Consequently, ﬁrms un-
der perfect competition pay a pollution tax on their net pollution Pt and they choose their
abatement activities Dt (whose cost equals Dt) and the amount of factors which maximize
their proﬁts πt = Yt −rtKt − wtLt −ϑtPt − Dt + T
p
t where ϑt is the pollution tax rate and T
p
t
denotes transfers from the public sector with T
p
t = ϑtPt. Firms take as given these transfers
and pay each production factor at its marginal productivity to maximize proﬁt:
rt = αA − ϑtγPt
Kt
wt = (1 − α)KtL−α
t
(7)
Dt = ϑtγPt (8)





. Because in the steady-state,
the quality of the environment must be constant, ϑt must evolve as the physical capital.
Intuitively, it increases over time to encourage ﬁrms to increase abatement activities to limitXavier Pautrel – “How environmental policy can promote growth” 7
pollution which rises with the physical capital stock. Consequently, we deﬁne τ ≡ ϑt/Kt,
the environmental tax normalized by the physical capital, and following Oueslati (2002) we
assume that it is ﬁxed by the government and has no transitional dynamics.5 Consequently,
we obtain:
P = Φ(τ)−γ (9)
with Φ(τ) ≡ [γτ]
1
1+γ is an increasing function of τ. The net ﬂow of pollution P is constant
over time. Then, equations (7) and (8) may be re-written as (remembering that population is
normalized to unity):
r = αA − Φ(τ) (10)
wt = (1 − α)Kt (11)
Dt = Φ(τ)Kt (12)
By deﬁnition Dt < Kt consequently we impose that Φ(τ) ∈]0,1[. Furthermore, r > 0,
therefore we also impose αA > Φ(τ).
From (5) and because we assumed λt = ε−1
t , the probability of death is independent of





where L(τ) is a decreasing function of τ.
Households face the following budget constraint:
˙ as,t = [r + λ] as,t + wt − cs,t (14)
where as,t is the ﬁnancial wealth in period t and ωt represents the wage rate per effective
unit of labor.
5Here this assumption is of no consequence inasmuch as the AK model has no transitional dynamics.Xavier Pautrel – “How environmental policy can promote growth” 8
The representative agent chooses the time path for cs,t by maximizing (1) subject to (14).
It gives the consumption at time t of an agent born at time s:
cs,t = ∆(τ)[as,t + ωs,t] (15)
where ωs,t ≡
  ∞
t wνe−(ν−t)(r+λ)dν is the present value of lifetime earning and
∆(τ) = (1 − σ)αA − (1 − σ)Φ(τ) + σρ + L(τ) (16)
is the propensity to consume the overall individual revenue and is constant over time.6 By
deﬁnition the propensity to consume must be positive, consequently we consider that the
probability to die is high enough to ensure that ∆(τ) is always positive. It implies:
L(τ) > (1 − σ)[Φ(τ) − αA] − σρ (17)
Because the interest rate must be positive (that is αA > Φ(τ) from equation 10) this condi-
tions is always veriﬁed whatever L(τ) when σ ≤ 1.




cs,tλe−λ(t−s)ds = ∆(τ)[Kt + Ωt] (18)
with Ωt ≡
  t





Differentiating (18) with respect to time and using the expression of dKt/dt and dΩt/dt
with equations (10) and (13) gives the law of motion of the aggregate consumption:
gC,t ≡ ˙ Ct/Ct = σ[αA − Φ(τ) − ρ] − L(τ)∆(τ)Kt/Ct (20)
Furthermore, the law of motion of the physical capital is:
gK,t ≡ ˙ Kt/Kt = (1− θ)A − Ct/Kt − Φ(τ) (21)




t rµdµdν which is not
constant.Xavier Pautrel – “How environmental policy can promote growth” 9
Consequently, deﬁning xt ≡ Ct/Kt, the economy is summarized by the two following
equations which depends on xt:
gC,t = σ[αA − Φ(τ) − ρ] − L(τ)∆(τ)x−1
t
gK,t = (1 − θ)A − xt − Φ(τ)
(22)
The ﬁrst equation is an increasing function of x and the second one is an decreasing func-
tion. When they intersect they deﬁne a unique x⋆ which corresponds to the steady-state
equilibrium of the economy, where C, K, D and Y grow at a common positive rate g⋆ (the
star denotes steady-state). Formally, x⋆ is the positive solution of the second-order equation










where Ω(τ) ≡ (θ + σα − 1) A + (1 − σ)Φ(τ) − σρ < 0 7 and ∆(τ) ≡ (1 − σ)[αA − Φ(τ)] +
σρ + L(τ).
The growth rate in the steady-state is unique and deﬁned as a function of the environ-
mental tax τ:









5 ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND GROWTH
To investigate the inﬂuence of the environmental taxation on growth, we derive (24) with

































∆(τ) ≡ (1 − σ)[αA − Φ(τ)] + σρ + L(τ) > 0
Ω(τ) ≡ (θ + σα − 1) A + (1 − σ)Φ(τ) − σρ < 0
The function Φ(τ) being an increasing function of τ, the inﬂuence of the environmental tax
is given by the sign of (26).
To clarify as much as possible the mechanisms which operate when pollution affects
health andhealth inﬂuencesthe lifetime ofagents, weﬁrst expose the case wherethe lifetime
of agents is inﬁnite and the case where lifetime is ﬁnite but pollution does not impact health.
Hence, we back to the general case exposed in the previous sections and we examinate
the effect of environmental taxation on growth when pollution affects health and health
inﬂuences the lifetime of agents.
5.1 Lifetime is inﬁnite
In this case, the probability of death is independent of the environmental policy because it
is null: L(τ) = 0. The system (22) becomes:
gC,t = σ[αA − Φ(τ) − ρ]
gK,t = (1 − θ)A − xt − Φ(τ)
The growth rate of the aggregate consumption becomes independent from x and conse-
quently is an horizontal curve which shifts downward when τ increases. The growth rate
of the aggregate capital remains a decreasing curve with respect to x and shifts on the leftXavier Pautrel – “How environmental policy can promote growth” 11
when τ increases. The variation of x⋆ depends on the value of σ with respect to 1 because
g⋆
C = g⋆
K gives x⋆ = (1 − θ − σα)A + (σ − 1)Φ(τ) + σρ > 0. When σ < 1 (respectively
σ > 1), x⋆ decreases (respectively increases) with τ. Nevertheless, the growth rate in the
steady-state is given by the ﬁrst equation of the previous system. It is a decreasing function
of the environmental tax rate.
Therefore, we obtain the conventional result of the AK growth model with inﬁnitly-lived
agents: environmental policy is always harmful to growth because it reduces the rewards to
capital and therefore physical capital accumulation.
5.2 Lifetime is ﬁnite but health is not affected by pollution
Thiscase corresponds to ψ = 0. Therefore, theprobability ofdeath λ doesnolongerdepends
on the tax rate τ: ¯ λ =
δ
βθ
. The economy is summarized by:





gK,t = (1 − θ)A − xt − Φ(τ)
with ∆ψ(τ) = (1− σ)αA −(1− σ)Φ(τ) + σρ+
δ
βθ
. gC,t remains an increasing function of xt
but the inﬂuence of τ is not clear-cut. gK,t is not modiﬁed.
The inﬂuence of the environmental tax on the steady-state rate of growth is then given




(1 + σ) + (1 − σ)
Ω(τ) + 2¯ λ
 
Ω(τ)2 + 4∆(τ)¯ λ
 
(27)
with Ω(τ) < 0 for all σ. When σ ≤ 1, (1 − σ)Ω(τ) ≤ 0, but
Ω(τ)
 
Ω(τ)2 + 4∆(τ)¯ λ
< 1
consequently (1 + σ) + (1 − σ)
Ω(τ)
 
Ω(τ)2 + 4∆(τ)¯ λ
≥ 0. The term into brackets is posi-








Ω(τ)2 + 4∆(τ)¯ λ




Ω(τ)2 + 4∆(τ)¯ λ
≥ 0. The term into brackets is positive, therefore ∂g⋆/∂τ < 0.Xavier Pautrel – “How environmental policy can promote growth” 12
Consequently, when the lifetime of agents is ﬁnite but pollution does not affect health
status, the environmental policy remains harmful to growth.
5.3 Lifetime is ﬁnite and pollution affects health
Because the general case is very cumbersome to study, we only investigate in this prelimi-
nary version the case where σ = 1. Then, ∆(τ) is a decreasing function τ and Ω(τ) = ¯ Ω is
independent of τ. Consequently, the inﬂuence of the environmental tax on growth is given

















¯ Ω2 + 4[ρ + L(τ)]L(τ)
> Φ(τ) (28)
with Φ(τ) ≡ [γτ]
1
1+γ and L(τ) ≡ δ
βθΦ(τ)−ψγ.
Because the left-hand side of this inequality is a decreasing function of τ,8 and the right-
hand side is an increasing function of τ, this inequality deﬁnes a threshold value ˆ τ below
which the condition is veriﬁed. Therefore, when pollution affects health and health inﬂu-
ences life expectancy environmental policy is ambiguous for growth. The link between the
environmental policy and growth is a reversed-U shape relation: for low values of the tax,
the environmental policy promotes growth and for high values it harms growth.
Consequently, from section 5.2, it is not the ﬁniteness of lifetime by itself which enables
the environmental policy to play positively on growth. It is a necessary but not sufﬁcient
condition. The sufﬁcient condition is that lifetime is bounded and depends on the environ-
ment.
8Its derivative with respect to τ is
γψ
 
ρ ¯ Ω2 + 2L(τ)
 
ρ2 + 2 ¯ Ω2 + 6ρL(τ)+ 4L(τ)2  




< 0.Xavier Pautrel – “How environmental policy can promote growth” 13
Using condition (28), it is possible to ﬁnd the impact of the determinants of the thresold
critical value of τ9
δ θ β A ρ ψ γ
ˆ τ + − − − + − ?
Table 1: Impact of the parameters on ˆ τ
We investigate further comparative statics in the next section.
6 NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
This sections aims at answering two questions. First, even if we derived analytically the
inﬂuence of parameters on the threshold value of the pollution tax, what are their effects
on the growth rate in the economy and how do they affect the positive inﬂuence of the
environmental taxation? Second, what is the inﬂuence of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption σ on the link between the environmental policy and growth?
To answer these questions, we use numerical simulations. We ﬁrst calibrate the model to
obtain realistic values of the probability of death for the US economy and a realistic rate of
growth. From the World Development Indicators 2005 by the World Bank, life expectancy
was 77.4 years in 2003, and the public health expenditures as percentage of GDP was 6.55%.
Since the expected lifetime is the reverse of the probability of death per unit of time λ, we
want λ to be close to 1/77.4 = 0.0129.
Table 1 summarizes the benchmark value of parameters and Table 2 summarizes the
exercise of comparative statics for log utility.
θ α δ ψ β ρ A γ
0.0655 0.03 0.025 2 20 0.065 0.7 0.3
Table 2: Benchmark value of parameters
9Remembre that Φ(τ) < 1. See page 4.Xavier Pautrel – “How environmental policy can promote growth” 14
The relation between environmental tax and the rate of growth obtained is drawn in
Figure 1. Thethreshold value ofthe environmental taxation ˆ τ is5.33%andthe rate of growth
for this value (which is also the maximum rate of growth attainable) equals 5.85%. Note also
that τ ∈]0.01,0.23[ to have a positive growth rate in the steady-state.
Figure 1: Benchmark case
In the appendix, we report the effects of a variation of the key parameters on the growth
rate and on the threshold value of environmental taxation. Numerical simulations show,
for example, that a higher public health expenditures in terms of GDP (θ) and a greater
productivity in the health sector (β) makes the environmental policy less likely to promote
growth. The maximum rate of growth (for an environmental tax equals to ˆ τ) is greater for all
values of the environmental tax. In the same way, when the inﬂuence of pollution on health
(ψ) increases, the threshold value of the environmental tax rises and the maximum rate of
growth is higher. Because these criterions are veriﬁed in the most industrialized countries,
our results mean that the environmental policy is more likely to promote growth is such a
countries.
Finally, we simulate the relation between the growth rate and the environment tax for
different values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ. For the values chosen in
our numerical simulations, ﬁgure 2 and Table 3 in the following conﬁrm our main resultXavier Pautrel – “How environmental policy can promote growth” 15
Figure 2: Increase in σ (the straightline is the benchmark case)
σ 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2 2.5
ˆ τ 0.1730 0.0948 0.0677 0.0533 0.0379 0.0297 0.0245
Table 3: Impact of an increase in σ
when σ is different from unity: the environmental tax has an ambiguous effect on growth
when pollution affects health and health inﬂuences the lifetime of agents. Furthermore, the
threshold value of the environmental taxation is lower when agents want to smooth their
consumption over time (σ is small): the environmental policy is more likely to harm growth
in such a case.
7 CONCLUSION
The aim of this article was to investigate the impact of environmental policy on growth in
an AK-type growth model, when the link pollution, health and life expectancy is the main
channel of transmission.
We demonstrated that environmental policy has an ambiguous effect on growth in the
steady-state when the detrimental effect of pollution on health and lifetime is taken into
account. For low levels of taxation, the environmental policy promotes growth because
the positive effect of a lower net ﬂow of pollution on health and life expectancy offsets theXavier Pautrel – “How environmental policy can promote growth” 16
drag-down effect on the investment due to the increasing tax. For higher levels, the environ-
mental policy becomes harmful to growth because the positive effect of health is defeated by
the drag-down effect. Furthermore, we show that the environmental policy is more likely
to promote growth when public expenditures in health and/or the impact of pollution on
health are more important.. We also make numerical simulations to investigate the inﬂu-
ence of the intertemporal substitution rate of consumption on our result. We ﬁnd that, for
the value of parameters chosen, the environmental policy is more likely to harm growth
when agents want to smooth consumption over time.
Finally, we demonstrated that the ambiguous impact of environmental policy on growth
disappears when the lifetime of agents is ﬁnite but pollution does not affect health: environ-
mental policy is always detrimental to growth. Consequently, the key mechanism relies on
the features of the health function and the dependence of health to the environment.
Our results militate for an active environmental policy and calls for further investiga-
tions on the link between environment and growth, especially incorporating a more realistic
health function.
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